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We have, in the past year, entered an entirely new dynamic in Eastern Mediterranean and South-East European strategic affairs. We are in a period and a region in which Russia, not the West, is taking the key initiatives and has much of the advantage. This is particularly significant given that Russian policymaking receives scant attention in US and other Western media, and remains as opaque to Western analysts as it was during the Cold War era when Russia was veiled by an Iron Curtain. At least during the Cold War, the West threw its best intellects into attempting to understand Russia and the Soviet Union.

Russia's recent major thrusts -- for a variety of historical, economic, and security reasons -- have been to dominate the Caucasus and Northern Tier, the Greater Black Sea Basin, and Central Asia. This has been evidenced particularly by Russia's successful initiatives to build strategic relations with Turkey and Iran. The profound depth of this transformation cannot be under-estimated, and, along with the stability of the European Union itself (which is inextricably bound to Russia for its energy), vitally affects the fate of South-Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean states.

At the same time that this tectonic shift is occurring, US policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean and adjacent lands has, for the past 60 years -- perhaps longer -- been heavily based on wishful romanticism, ignorance, and an overwhelming and narrow preoccupation with the containment of the now-defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. US policy toward the region continues to be based around a premise of a Soviet threat which no longer exists, but which the US -- and for that matter, some in Britain -- cannot bring themselves to retire or revise. And by continuing to treat post-Cold War Russia as though it was still the Soviet Union, the US and UK have to a large degree caused Moscow to act in manners contrary to Western interests.

The US-led NATO caused alarm in post-Soviet Russia by moving to bring former Soviet bloc states into NATO, by treating Islamist terrorism in the Caucasus as something Moscow deserved while 9/11 was something the US did not deserve, and so on. The poorly-handled attempted deployments of missile defense systems by the US into Poland, the Czech Republic, and Azerbaijan further alienated Moscow, quite apart from the gratuitous refusal to allow Russia to become part of the West; US tacit or active support for Georgian attempts to seize control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the US blatant interference in the elections in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic and in creating Kosovo as a supposedly independent state -- with attempts to do the same elsewhere -- were all further examples of perceived post-Cold War US hostility toward Moscow. There are many other examples of events which forced Moscow to return to a lonely course of action in pursuit of securing its own interests in a hostile world.

The high cost to the West of pursuing such a mumpsimus policy -- that is, policy which persists even though the underlying premises have clearly been proven to be erroneous -- is becoming evident as Western economies and Western strategic influence decline. The Western tide is retreating, showing the ground truths, once covered by the sea of wealth and power which had allowed the Cold War fixations to remain unchallenged.

We still see the persistence of Washington-based myths about the Eastern Mediterranean, South-Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus, and those myths have become more expensive to sustain, and more in the nature of comic opera. The result has been that, while the USSR and the threat of ideologically-based East-West confrontation has passed, Russia has been forced to respond by considering the reality that the West would not let the Cold War end. As a result, Russia has had to resume fending for itself in the regions of its immediate neighborhoods, including South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Asia Minor, and the Levant and the associated Eastern Mediterranean. It was forced into accommodations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over Central Asia, and while some of these were sensible for global trade as a whole, the resulting Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged in part as a mutual security regime which reinforces the growth of Chinese strategic power as well as the resurrection of some Russian regional hegemonic influence.

The declining strategic influence of the United States -- again, something not recognized in Washington, given that it remains lost in the mists of its own self-importance -- means that the new tensions of South-Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean have emerged full-blown and there seems little that Washington is prepared to do to accommodate this. The reality is that Western policy toward Turkey and Russia still centers around approaches decided by the British Foreign Office during and after the Crimean campaign which ended in 1856.

At the same time, of course, the French historian, Alexis de Toqueville, also forecast in the first half of the 19th Century that Russia and the United States, as continental powers, must inevitably be rivals and must compete over Europe. So these ancient views of Russia as the perpetual enemy, and Turkey as the inevitable counterbalance to Russia, have shaped British and American strategic sentiments, just as romantic orientalism has shaped Western views of the Middle East and Asia. [Indeed, I would not say that the West should lose sight of the potential for Turkey to be used as a counter-balance to Russia, but this should not be an unthinking, perpetual, and universal policy, when, as in World War I and II, Turkey was not, in fact, always an ally of the West (or an asset to it), whereas Russia and the USSR were, at key times, allies of the West.]

A perspective of the context of actual Western geopolitical and economic interests, and the realities of history, have rarely played a dominant rôle in US or British strategic policymaking since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, Russian strategic policymaking has reverted to the age-old geopolitical and geoeconomic principles which have dominated Russian security for 500 years.

A year ago, however, it became conclusively apparent that Russia had, as a result of Moscow's initiatives and because of the changing global circumstance, become the power with dominance over Turkey. This was the result of trends which had been some time in the making, but my early reporting in March 2009 of that phenomenon -- and the implications it had for Western policy and for Greece and Turkey -- drew no response from the media or from policy officials. To its great credit, the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) took a gamble and published a report of mine in 2009 on the new Russo-Turkish strategic relationship. Only now, a year later, is the West reluctantly coming to grips with the fact that Russia is far more persuasive than the West with regard to Turkey, because Turkey is absolutely strategically in thrall to Moscow.

The same situation applies to Iran. And, indeed, we need to understand that it is impossible to formulate viable policy in Washington with regard to Turkey unless the broad context of Turkish, Russian, Iranian, Chinese, Caucasus, Black Sea, and other dynamics are taken into account. Western analysis is, in fact, guilty of stovepiping and geographic specialization, ignoring the historical and spatial context which drives reality.

The Genoese built a fortress on the site of present-day Monaco in 1215. The current ruling Grimaldi family secured control in the late 13th century, and a principality was established in 1338. Economic development was spurred in the late 19th century with a railroad linkup to France and the opening of a casino. Since then, the principality's mild climate, splendid scenery, and gambling facilities have made Monaco world famous as a tourist and recreation center.

Today, Prince Albert II exercises his sovereign authority over Monaco in accordance with the Constitution and laws of 1962. He represents the Principality in all foreign relations.

Monaco is not a member of the European Union but is very closely linked to it via a customs union with France, and as such its currency is the same as that of France: the euro. Before 2002, Monaco minted its own franc coins, the Monegasque franc. Monaco has acquired the right to mint euro coins with their own insignias on their national side.

Monaco levies no income tax on individuals. The absence of a personal income tax in the principality has attracted to it a considerable number of wealthy "tax refugee" residents from European countries who derive the majority of their income from activity outside Monaco; celebrities such as Formula One drivers attract most of the attention, but the vast majority of them are less well-known business people.

Currently around seventy banks operate in Monaco providing 300,000 bank accounts. Banks of Monaco provide bank account mostly to Monaco non-residents: around 85% of customers are non-residents and only 15% residents (50,000 local customers versus 250,000 foreigners). Total turnover of banking sector is above $1.5 billion. Despite the fact that large part of Monaco banking customers are physical persons, number of corporate clients also rises steadily.

The world's second smallest country and popular tax haven Monaco is to start collating and publishing figures showing it's GDP for the first time. Recognizing that collecting financial information could put off wealthy individuals moving to Monaco, the government has told those businessmen taking part that all information will be kept confidential, and will not be used for fiscal purposes.

Continue reading "Tax Haven Monaco to Start Recording Finance Figures"

Serbia's former justice minister accused Greek Cypriot authorities yesterday of complicity in the illegal transfer of billions of dollars to Cyprus during the 1990s United Nations embargo against Yugoslavia. Vladan Batic told a Nicosia court the Yugoslav government had arranged for "sacks and suitcases full of cash" to be flown from Belgrade to Nicosia and deposited in accounts of "front" companies held by Cyprus Popular Bank, now known as Laiki Bank.

Continue reading "Cyprus Aided Money Laundering"

by George Farrugia

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888.com the Online Casino Company announced at its Annual General Meeting held in Gibraltar on Wednesday that net gaming revenues rose 42 per cent to $84 million in the first quarter compared with the same period last year, with poker revenues of $39 million and casinos bringing in $45 million.

The group, which increased its active users to 319,374 over the first quarter period, added that the 17-day World Snooker Championship it sponsored drove up its exposure in a market dominated by its far larger rival PartyGaming.

Recently I came across an interesting website with great articles for Offshore Investment & Investment Property Abroad, it's called "Shelter Offshore", the proprietors are from Nicosia Cyprus and here is how they describe themselves;

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By James Bennett -

Betting exchange could move operations offshore if 'punitive' tax laws are enforced by the UK Treasury

One of Britain's leading online betting exchanges, Betfair, is considering relocating its operations from the UK to Malta in anticipation of new tax laws being introduced on its revenues.