Results tagged “Soviet Union”

On April 7, 2010 the President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev fled the capital city of Bishkek that was under a state of emergency after antigovernment protesters started clashing with security forces following incidents that started in the Northern city of Talas, close to the Kazakhstan border. By the end of April 7, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty was reporting 40 dead and 400 wounded, numbers that have over doubled since. In this context, one can only wonder which country in Central Asia could be next, if any, and which Central Asian leader could find himself out of a job and possibly on an airplane.

The ongoing events are monitored very closely as Central Asia is a very sensitive region: it is rich in natural resources, notably energy (oil & gas and a large hydropower potential), and as Kyrgyzstan hosts two military based on its soil - one U.S., the Manas Air Base (now called the "Transit Center at Manas International Airport"), and one Russian, the Kant Air Base. The U.S. base plays a critical role with operations in nearby Afghanistan and will stay in place according to Kyrgyz interim leader Roza Otunbayeva.

Manas constitutes a financial bonanza of tens of millions of dollars in addition to all the jobs created around the daily operations of the base. In 2009 the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement, renewing the right for the U.S. to use the facilities for $60 million/year, which is over three times more than what was paid before.

These events are also closely monitored inside the presidential palaces of neighboring Central Asia countries as this revolution, like some that took place in Eastern Europe and Eurasia since 2000, did not take much to topple the government.

All Central Asian leaders where elected through elections that the OSCE considers as failing at different levels to meet international democratic standards which prevents the development of a pluralistic political system. In this context, there is no real way for the opposition, or the people espousing the view of the opposition, to express utter dissatisfaction other than by demonstrating in the streets.

Protesters can be shot at and quieted temporarily like in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005, or they can succeed in ousting their government like in Kyrgyzstan. The fact that the people can go down in the streets to voice their discontent with their government is a dire reminder that a silent or silenced public opinion is not one without an opinion and a that a little spark can launch an entire sequence of events, even more so as there are many worms in the Central Asian apple, fruit which is supposed to have originated from Central Asia.

Why Kyrgyzstan?

The events in Kyrgyzstan do not come as a surprise, except for those who wondered why news about the return of Tiger Woods was occasionally being bypassed in prime time news by events in a mostly unknown country. What was a true surprise is the speed at which events unfolded. They were triggered by an increase in fuel and electricity rates but the spark came in an explosive climate of latent and massive dissatisfaction with the regime in place.

This is not the first time Kyrgyzstan experiences a spring-cleaning revolution. Almost exactly five years ago, the 2005 Tulip Revolution ousted then President Askar Akayev under allegations of widespread corruption and cronyism. Bakiyev fell for the same ills, the resentment being exacerbated by an authoritarian drift that led to the shutting down of independent news media, the arrest of prominent opposition leaders and blatant nepotism with Bakiyev's family securing key positions.

Bakiyev's brother Marat was serving as ambassador in Germany but will be recalled, while his brother Adyl was an advisor to the Kyrgyz ambassador in China. In October 2009, Bakiyev appointed his son Maksim to head the newly created Central Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovation (CADII) while another son worked for the National Security Service.

The Scorecard of Central Asia

Some leaders are more enlightened than others in understanding that the distribution of wealth cannot just benefit a small minority: enabling their population to become more prosperous like in Kazakhstan allows everyone to see opportunities and not feel excluded. Central Asia is burdened by a ruling class and elite with vested interests, creating a natural brake to any efforts to change the way things are done.

Change can unleash unforeseen events and the fear of its consequences explains the efforts made to maintain the status quo. Allowing too much democracy and dissenting voices to be heard is equivalent to opening a Pandora box: too much transparency coupled with greater accountability leads to questions that challenges and weakens the legitimacy of the governments in place.

Looking at the levels of freedom and corruption and at the ease of doing business are good indicators of where Central Asian countries stand, even if some ratings are perception indexes. These reports can convey a bleak picture of Central Asian countries and are partially unfair as each country has some potential and there are many Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks that strive to abide by high standards and who can be trustworthy partners. Changing a system is not easy.

Freedom

Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world, will release at the end of Spring 2010 its Freedom in the World 2010 Report but preliminary findings should that "virtually all of the countries in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union continued to pursue a repressive course, including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which was downgraded from Partly Free to Not Free" further stating that "of the 47 countries ranked Not Free, nine countries and one territory received the survey's lowest possible rating for both political rights and civil liberties: Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Tibet, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan."

Corruption

On November 17, 2009 Transparency International, a civil society organization fighting corruption worldwide, released its 2009 annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. There were no major changes from the 2008 CPI, with most of the Central Asian countries ranking towards the bottom of the totem pole. The best performing country, Kazakhstan, ranked # 120 compared to #145 in 2008; followed by Tajikistan at #158 compared to #151; Kyrgyzstan at #162 compared to #166; Turkmenistan at #168 compared to #166; and Uzbekistan #174 compared to #166.

Ease of Doing Business

In the 2010 World Bank's Doing Business Report which ranks 183 countries on their ease of doing business, the ranking is also mostly disappointing: Uzbekistan ranks #150 compared to # 145 the year before; Tajikistan makes a commendable leap forward from # 164 to # 152 but has still a long way to go; Kazakhstan remains stable at # 63 compared to # 64 in the 2009 Report; Kyrgyzstan is mentioned at one of the top 10 reformers, ranking # 41 compared to # 80 just a year before; and Turkmenistan is not even mentioned.

Each country has its own reality

So, in this context, could another regime fall like in Kyrgyzstan? One thing to understand is that uprisings can happen naturally or be planned. If a revolution was to be fomented or supported from within the system, anyone involved would have to be sure to be able to overthrow the existing government: failure would be met with dire consequences and even exile may not be enough to stay alive. The chance of seeing such uprisings, initiated from within the apparatus, or from criminal groups, is limited.

Uprisings that happen naturally (if we can say so) and unfold like in Kyrgyzstan are possible but each Central Asian country has a different local reality that needs to be looked at closely, and special attention should be given to the points of view of the citizen who don't necessarily want to turn their life upside down for change that may not bring a better life.

The tragic news of the 29 March twin suicide bombings of two Moscow Metro stations during the morning rush hour has produced outrage worldwide, with the Kremlin quickly adding that the attacks were carried out by the Caucasus Mujaheddin, a northern Caucasus-based militant Islamist guerrilla group that claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Moscow to St. Petersburg express train last November.

The grim death toll can be seen as yet another statistic in the Kremlin's ongoing war with Chechnya separatists that erupted in December 1994. Underneath and driving the savagery of the last 16 years is a resource that few commentators note - oil.

The two female suicide bombers were caught by closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras boarding the metro at Yugo-Zapadnaya station in the far southwest of the city in the early morning, assisted onto the train by two other women. According to the CCTV videos, the quartet seemed to be between 18 and 20; two of them were clearly of Slavic appearance.

The first bomber blew herself up at Lubyanka metro station at 7.56am. H er bomb, equivalent to about four kilograms of TNT, exploded at the height of rush hour and killed at least 25 people inside a train that had just pulled into the Lubyanka station. The explosive used was believed to be hexogen (RDX); the device was filled with iron scrap and screws for shrapnel. There has been to speculation that the second bomb, detonated at the Park Kultury station, was in fact supposed to have been detonated at the Oktyabrskaya station, next to the Ministry of the Interior.

Kremlin experts lost no time in asserting that the incident had implications far beyond Russia, claiming that the Caucasus Mujaheddin receives inspiration and financial support from unnamed networks both in the East and the West. As the death toll mounts, the bombings represent Moscow's worst terrorist attack since February 2004, when a suicide bombing killed at least 39 people and wounded more than 100 on a metro train.

What is certain at the moment is that the carnage will continue, as last month Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov, fighting for an Islamic emirate embracing the northern Cacuasus, vowed to take the conflict to Russian cities, noting in an interview on an Islamist website, "Blood will no longer be limited to our cities and towns. The war is coming to their cities."

The attacks are a direct assault on Russian President Vladimir Putin, former KGB operative. The Lubyanka bombing is highly symbolic, as it is the subway stop for the employees of the KGB's successor organization, the FSB, a two-minute walk from Red Square. London Royal United Services Institute analyst Jonathan Eyal observed, "This is a direct affront to Vladimir Putin, whose entire rise to power was built on his pledge to crush the enemies of Russia ... It's an affront to his muscular image."

Few today remember that Putin's first job when appointed Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin was to build an oil pipeline bypassing Chechyna, as Transneft, Russia's pipeline monopoly, controlled the Baku-Novorossiisk line, the sole export route for Azerbaijani "early" oil exports, which crossed 95 miles of Chechen territory, a region which had been at war with the Kremlin since 1994. Following Putin's appointment Yeltsin held a council of war over Dagestan and Putin made a rash promise that he could end a crisis caused by the incursion of 2,000 rebels from Chechnya into Dagestan in "a week and a half or two weeks."

Work began on the bypass line on 26 October. The conflict combined with other issues reduced Azeri exports via Baku-Novorossiisk in early 2000 to an average of only 10,000 barrels per day (bpd.) In April 2000 construction finished on the $140 million, 204-mile Baku-Novorossiisk bypass via Dagestan to Tikhoretsk. The bypass had a potential capacity of 120,000 bpd, but by then Azerbaijan already had other plans, having worked with neighboring Georgia to develop an alternative pipeline route to Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa, completely outside of Russian control. When Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999 Putin became acting President and has continued to lead the Russian state ever since, initially as President and since 2008 as Prime Minister.

Putin has made it a centerpiece of his policy to resolve Chechnya for once and for all, but as the Moscow bombings so, eleven years after his accession to power, Chechnya continues to roil Russia. The issues go back to the 1991 December collapse of the USSR. When the first Chechen war erupted in 1994, many observers were baffled as to why Moscow, which had peacefully let the Soviet Union implode, was so determined to hang on to Chechnya, a small poor mountainous region in the Caucasus measuring only 30 by 70 miles.

But oil greased the equation from the outset. The post-Soviet development of the Caspian's vast reserve of oil and natural gas quickly became Russia's fixation, with an ever increasing importance as the rest of the post-Soviet economy withered. Energy was the one export that the Russian Federation could still produce that was guaranteed an international market, and its importance has only risen with time.

Gazprom faces regular opprobrium for its bullying ways of using energy as a pressure and political tool. Seen by some, mostly Russians, as the symbol of a successful and strong Russia, others see it as a dominating juggernaut, economic right arm of the Kremlin implementing, or should we say, imposing its policies by using energy as a weapon.

Just like Louis XIV used to say "L'Etat c'est moi" (I am the State), Gazprom could say the same in light of its commercial power and the unconditional governmental backing it enjoys. However, just like Monsanto generates passionate debates with its genetically engineered seeds, Gazprom's activities cannot be simply labeled as right or wrong and subject to final judgments.

Though far from being an angel, Gazprom is not necessarily a demon either. It is easy to point fingers and to forget that oil & gas is a merciless sector where every major is trying to position itself for the next 20 to 30 years and secure predictable supply and demand at home and abroad. After all, large Western energy companies were not born nice and proper. It took decades for codes of conduct, tacit or written, to be adopted and enforced. It is also easy to forget that all energy companies have in mind the interests of the country they come from.

Why would it be any different for Gazprom? And why should Gazprom take upon itself to act differently if it can get away with what it does and not be sanctioned by its own government?

The main issue with Gazprom could be summarized by using the famous quote of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who said about Iraq "there are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we do not know we don't know." Because of all the things we do not know about Gazprom, sensitivity to what Gazprom does is greater because ultimately what it decides to do today and how it does it will impact energy supplies for years to come and how the game is played.

The lack of information on the personal relationships between the business and political world, on its exact ownership structure, on the exact identity and role of business intermediaries, on the flow of money through a labyrinthine network of offshore and shell companies, and on the overall exact modus operandi of Gazprom is what leads Gazprom to be subject to greater scrutiny and interrogations. It efforts to maintain an export monopoly for gas flowing to Europe and Asia at a huge cost, possibly over-committing dwindling resources at a time of lower energy prices and lower needs from consumers is another concern as would happen if Gazprom was to fail?